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Domestic Relations
Domestic Relations; adoption investigations-fingerprinting
Civil Code §226.55 (new).
SB 1077 (Coombs); STATS 1973, Ch 596
Opposition: Attorney General of California
Section 226.6 of the Civil Code requires the Department of Health
or the licensed county adoption agency to investigate all proposed
adoptions. A full report of the facts disclosed by the investigation
along with a recommendation must be submitted to the court within
180 days after the petition for adoption is filed. If the investigation
discloses a serious question concerning the suitability of either the
petitioners, the care provided the child, or the availability of the consent to adoption, the report must be filed immediately with the court.
Section 226.55 has been added to provide that the Department of
Health or a local public adoption agency may require persons desiring
to adopt a child to be fingerprinted and may secure from the Federal
Bureau of Investigation or State Department of Justice the full criminal
record, if any, of such person.
COMMENT

Fingerprinting is one method of providing a positive identification
leading to a full and complete background of prospective adopting
parents before children are placed in their custody. The language
of Section 226.55, however, is permissive rather than mandatory; no
standards are set forth to determine when fingerprints will be required
or when a criminal record should be secured. Such permissive language may allow this section to be used in a manner that will have
a discriminatory effect. Also, it is unclear whether a refusal to submit
to fingerprinting will constitute grounds for denying the petition for
adoption.
Domestic Relations; adoption-birth certificates
Health and Safety Code §§10433, 10433.4 (amended).
AB 104 (Boatwright); STATS 1973, Ch 960
Support: California Association of Adoption Agencies
Section 10432 of the Health and Safety Code provides that a new
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Domestic Relations

birth certificate is to be issued by the State Registrar upon receipt
of a report of adoption. Section 10433 provides that the new certificate is to be identical with a certificate registered for the birth of
a child of natural parents, and that the adopting parents shall appear
as the minor's natural parents. The adopting parents are allowed to
request that the new certificate not indicate the name and address
of the hospital where the birth occurred. Section 10433.4 provides
that the adopting parents, subsequent to issuance of the new certificate,
may request issuance of an amended certificate which deletes the city
and county of birth and the name and address of the hospital.
Section 10433 has been amended to allow the adopting parents to
request deletion of their color and race from the new birth certificate.
Section 10433.4 has been amended to allow the adopting parents to
request deletion of their color and race from the amended certificate.
See Generally:
1) 3 WiTKIN, SUMMARY OF CALnwoRNIA LAW, Parent and Child §88 (Supp. 1969).
2) 3 PAc. L.J., REVIEW OF SELECrED 1971 CAuFoRmNI LEGISLATIOi 339, 340 (1972).

Domestic Relations; community property
Civil Code §§5101, 5124 (repealed); §§5102, 5105, 5110, 5113.5,
5116, 5117, 5120, 5121, 5122, 5123, 5125, 5127, 5131, 5132
(amended); §199 (new); Welfare and Institutions Code §§12101,
17300 (amended).
SB 569 (Dymally); STATS 1973, Ch 987
Support: League of Women Voters; Business and Professional
Women; American Association of University Women
Chapter 987, which will become operative on January 1, 1975,
makes two substantial changes in the community property law in California. It will give equal management and control to both spouses
and will make the community property subject to the post-marriage
obligations of either spouse. Prior to this enactment Civil Code Section 5105 provided equal interests in the community property for both
spouses but the property was primarily under the management and
control of the husband. Chapter 987 has deleted the reference to
management and control by the husband and states simply that the
respective interests of the spouses in community property during marriage are present, existing, and equal. Any question as to the intent
of the legislature in making the deletion is answered by the amendments to Sections 5125 and 5127. Prior to amendment, these sections
gave the husband management and control.
Chapter 987 has
Pacific Law Journal Vol, 5
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amended Section 5125 to provide that either spouse has the management and control of the community personal property, with like absolute power of disposition other than testamentary, as each has over
his separate property subject to the restrictions that previously applied
to the husband. Section 5123(b), as amended, provides that a spouse
who is operating or managing a business which is community personal
property has the sole management and control of that business. Section 5127 has been amended to give either spouse management and
control over the community real property but provides that both must
join in executing an instrument which conveys, encumbers, or leases
such property for longer than one year. One effect of the abovementioned amendments is that Section 5124, which gave the wife
management and control of the community personal property earned
by her and of the community personal property received by her in
satisfaction of claims for her personal injuries, will no longer be effective and is repealed.
Chapter 987 has effected substantial change in the community property law as it relates to the claims of creditors on that property. Section 5116 stated that the property of the community was not liable
for the contracts of the wife made after marriage unless the husband
executed a pledge of liability. Section 5116 as amended will provide
that the community property is liable for the contracts of either spouse
made after marriage and on or after January 1, 1975, subject to the
restriction that the wages of one spouse shall not be garnished for
debts of the other spouse.
Section 5117 specifies that the earnings and community property
personal injury damages of the wife are free from the debts of the
husband, except when the debts are incurred to provide necessities
of life while the husband and wife are living together. Chapter 987
has amended Section 5117 to provide that those earnings and personal
injury damages are not subject to the husband's debts if incurred prior
to January 1, 1975.
Section 5120 exempts the husband's separate property and earnings
after marriage from liability for the debts of the wife which were contracted for prior to marriage. Section 5121 exempts the wife's separate
property from liability for debts of her husband except expenses for
necessities while they live together. Currently this liability for necessities applies only to separate property obtained by the wife after marriage, which property is not obtained from her husband. Chapter
987 has amended these sections to make the treatment of both spouses
Selected 1973 California Legislation
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equal. Section 5120 has been amended to provide that neither the
separate property nor the earnings after marriage of a spouse is liable
for the debts of the other spouse which were contracted before marriage. Section 5121 frees the separate property of either spouse from
liability for the other spouse's debts contracted after marriage, except
in the case of necessities.
Prior to amendment, Section 5122 allowed the liability of a married
person for death or injury to person or property to be satisfied from
the separate property of that spouse and from the community property
under his control. The section has been amended to distinguish the
type of property available to satisfy a judgment on the basis of the
nature of the tortious act performed. If the act by which the liability
was incurred was being done for the benefit of the community, the
liability is satisfied first'from community property and then from the
separate property of that person. If the act is not for the benefit
of the community, liability is to be satisfied first from' the person's
separate property and then from community property.
Chapter 987 has amended Section 5123, which formerly provided
that the separate property of the wife was not liable for debts secured
by pledges of the community property without her written consent.'
The section now gives equal treatment to either spouse in this regard
for obligations executed on or after January 1, 1975, so that the separate property of both is now liable.
Section 5131 provided that a husband was not liable for the support of his wife while they were living separately by agreement. This
section has been amended to provide this freedom from liability to
either spouse unless such support is stipulated in the agreement. Section 5132 required the wife to support the husband out of her separate property if they were living together, he had no separate property,
there was no community or quasi-community property, and he was
unable from infirmity to support himself. This section has been
amended to require either spouse to support the other out of his own
separate property if they are living together and there is no community
property or quasi-community property. The requirement that the supported spouse have no separate property has been deleted.
In addition, Chapter 987 has added Section 199 to the Civil Code
to provide that a mother and father may be required to support their
natural children only out of their earnings and separate property if
there has been a dissolution of the marriage. This section prevents
this obligation of support from encumbering the community property
Pacific Law Journal Vol. 5
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of any subsequent marriage 'except the earnings of either parent. Since
it is likely that only the husband will be required- to provide support
andalso likely that he will continue to, have a job, this section should
pose no problems. In those. cases where the father does not have
earnings or separate property, he is also, unlikely to accumulate community property which could provide support to his children.
Chapter 987, in keeping with its theme of - equality, has repealed
Section 5101 which proclaimed the husband as head of the family
and allowed him to choose the place and mode of living. However,
other Civil Code sections still describe the husband as the head of
the family-for example, Section 261 defines head of the family for
homesteading.
Section 5102 has been amended to procvide that neither spouse has
an interest in the separate property of the other. Though "separate'
was not included in the section previously, the courts had construed
it as though it was, because Section 5105 had previously given them
equal interests in community property.
Section 5110, which provided that property acquired by a married
woman by an instrument in writing was presumed to be her separate
property, has been amended so that this pre'sumption shall apply only
to property acquired prior to' January 1, 1975. As amended, the
section requires that such property be treated as community property
so as to place the woman on equal footing with her spouse, for whom
this presumption did not apply. Section 5113.5, which states that
community property placed in trust may remain community property,
has been amended by this chapter to conform to the granting of equal
control over community property under Sections 5125 and 5127.
Chapter 987 has also amended Sections 12101 and 17300 of the
Welfare and Institutions Code relhtive to an adult child's requirement
to reimburse the state for a portion of the' state aid received by the
child's parent and to subsequently contribute that amount to the parent. Section 12101 previously provided that the income to be used
in calculating the child's contribution was defined as the sum of the
income constituting the separate property of that child, and the earnings of that child but not of 'his spouse. This section has been
amended to provide for a separate determination of inebme depending on whether the child is male or female. A male child's income
will be computed asit was before amendment' of the section. The
female child's income for determination of her contribution is the
sum of the income constituting the separate property of the female
Selected 1973 California Legislation
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and the earnings of the female but not of her spouse. Thus for the
female the income which is community property subject to her control
by virtue of this chapter's amendment to Section 5125 of the Civil
Code is not to be added in determining her monthly contribution to
her parent. The amendment to Section 17300 merely adds a paragraph which reiterates the differentiation made in Section 12101 as
to the factors to be taken into account in determining the ability and
amount of contribution of the child to its parent depending on the
child's sex.
COMMENT
California's community property system is derived from the SpanishMexican civil law in effect at the time of annexation of California
[Knutson, Califorhia Community Property Laws: A Plea For Legislative Study, 39 So. CAL. L. REv. 240 (1966)]. At that time, the
reality of the respective roles played by husband and wife in society
made it quite reasonable to give management and control of the community property to the husband. Also the male's traditional disdain
for the business acumen of the female caused the legislatures of
the time to protect, as much as possible, the community property from
being subject to liability for the debts of the wife. Though Chapter
987 does not eliminate all vestiges of this attitude, it does attempt
to end some of the more obvious discriminatory effects of the community property laws.
The ability of the legislature to take exclusive management and control over community property out of the hands of the husband and
to give equal control to the wife would at one time have been subject
to constitutional challenge in California [Spreckels v. Spreckels, 116
Cal. 339, 48 P. 228 (1897)].
This case which held that changes
in the community property system which affected vested rights could
not constitutionally be applied retroactively was not successfully challenged until 1965 [Addison v. Addison, 62 Cal. 2d 558, 399 P.2d
897, 43 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1965)]. Even though the holding was partly
based on a premise that the applicable statute did not apply except
in the case of divorce or separate maintenance and thus was not being
applied retroactively, the recognition that vested rights might be
changed if necessary for the public welfare signaled the attitude of
the court.
While Chapter 987 takes a step in the right direction by giving
the husband and wife equal power of disposition and control over
the community property and by making the community property subPacific Law Journal Vol. 5
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ject to the debts of the wife, it will not likely bring equality in the
market place to women. Section 5116 while subjecting the community
property to liability for a wife's debts will possibly have little effect
on her ability to get credit, particularly when she is not working. Since
the husband's wages cannot be garnished, and the merchant may not
know whether there is community property which is not exempt from
judgment execution, the merchant is not apt to extend credit without
the husband's guarantee. This is true even with the 1974 additions

to the Civil Code [A.B. 312,

CAL. STATS.

1973, c. 999]. Under that

enactment a woman may not be denied credit if her uncommingled
earnings or separate property are such that a man possessing the same
amount of property or earnings would receive credit. However, in
the great majority of homes in which the wife is not working she
will not have any uncommingled earnings or separate property.
Similar to the change to Section 5116, the amendment of Section
5123 requiring written assent of the spouse to subject his personal
property to liability is likely to have little actual impact. Credit managers desire as much security as they can obtain, and this new law
is not likely to halt their attempt to insure against all eventualities
by requiring both signatures. The legislature, by adopting a scheme
of equal management and control instead of joint management and
control, has avoided the requirement of getting the signatures of
both husband and wife for all transactions, which could have caused
numerous problems in day-to-day transactions, particularly spousal
sales of community property. For example, many men felt that requiring their wife's signature every time they wished to make a transaction
in the stock market would be extremely burdensome. Also they were
fearful that the consent might be withheld for petty reasons. The
provision that a spouse operating a business has sole management and
control, even though the business is community property, also should
silence many of these critics. Without this provision it was felt that
a spouse who knew nothing about the operation of a particular business could insist on exercising her right to equal management and
control.
One of the problems not solved by equal management and control
is the dissipation of community property by an unhappy spouse, an
event that often takes place immediately prior to dissolution. Since
this chapter does not require the signatures of both spouses, the community property is still subject to dissipation by an unhappy spouse
and now either spouse can dissipate it. However, a wife after separation is less likely to dissipate the community property than the husband
Selected 1973 California Legislation
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since her earnings are likely to be small and she will need to rely
on her share of the community property to supplement her income.
The man, with his higher earnings, should be able to live without
the need of supplementary income from Community property.
The validity of the amendments to Sections 12101 and 17300 of
the Welfare and Institutions Code relating to a child's support of a
,needy parent is subject to question. Section 12101 has been held
to be constitutional in requiring a child to pay a disproportionate 'share
of the funding of a program 'which is a proper state function only
when there is a rational ground for imposing that burden. Where
the child has no preexisting duty to'-support *the parent, he cannot
be .made to reimburse the county [See County of San Mateo v. Boss,
3 Cal. 3d 962, 479 P.2d 654, 92 Cal. Rptr. 294 (1971)]. The
amendments provided by this chapter should subject the legislation
to further attack on the basis of equal protection. Utilizing all of
the income over which the husband has' control in the determination
of this contribution to his parent while only utilizing a portion of the
income under the control of the wife to determine her contribution
would appear to be an arbitrary classification on the basis of sex.
Contrary to the amendments to the Civil Code which purport to emphasize equality, these amendments of the Welfare and Insitutitons
Code discriminate on the basis of sex and are thus questionable, particularly if the equal rights amendment should be ratified [See Note,
Equal Rights and Equal Protection: Who Has Management and Control?,-46 So. CAL. L. REv. 892 (1973)]. 'With the repeal of Section
5124 of the Civil Code, a separate standard for determination of the
adult female's contribution to the parent support should no longer have
been required. Prior to this it was felt that a daughter had to have
income which constituted her separate property in order to compel
her to contribute [See 20 Ops. ATT'Y GEN. 164 (1952)].
See Generally:
1) 4 WrmKwN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA-LAW, Community Property §§1-65 (7th ed.

2)
3)

4)
5)

1960).
TEx. FAm. CODE ANN. §5.01 et seq. (1970) (similar statutory scheme).
H. VERRALL & A. SAMMIS, CALIFORNIA COMMUNITY PROPERTY (2d ed. 1971).

JOINT COMMITrEE ON JUDICIARY, TRANSCRIPT OF HEARINGS ON COMMUNITY PROPERTY (1972).
Knutson,' California Community Property Laws: A Plea for Legislative Study, 39
So. CAL. L. REv. 240 (1966).

Domestic Relations; credit for women
Civil Code Chapter 2 (commencing with §1812.30) (new); §5116
(amended).
Pacific Law Journal Vol. 5
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AB 312 (Waxman); STATS 1973, Ch 999
Support: League of Women Voters of California, Inc.; Los Angeles
County Federation of Labor, AFL-CIO; National Organization for
Women of California
Section 1812.30 has been added to the Civil Code to provide that
no woman, regardless of marital status, shall be denied credit in her
own name if her uncommingled earnings or separate property are such
that a man with similar earnings or property would be granted credit.
The person extending credit, however, is not prohibited from, utilizing
other relevant factors or methods in determining whether to extend
credit to a woman. For the purposes of this section credit has been
defined as "obtainance of money, property, labor, or services on a
deferred-payment basis." Additionally, a credit reporting agency
must, upon the written request of a married person, identify within
the report delivered by the agency both the credit history of each
spouse and of their joint accounts if they have such information on
file.
Section 1812.31 has been added to provide that a woman who suffers any damage as a result of a willful violation of the provisions
of Section 1812.30 may on her own behalf, and for her own benefit
only, bring an action to recoyer actual damages and $500 in addition, for each violation. The woman may also petition the court to
order the violator to extend credit to her upon such terms, conditions,
and standards as he normally utilizes in granting credit to males.
Previously, Section 5116 provided that the community property was
not liable for the contracts of the wife made after marriage unless
secured by her husband's pledge. Chapter 999 has amended this section to provide that the community property is liable for the contracts
of the wife which are made after marriage and on or after January
1, 1974, to the extent that her earnings or separate property have
become community property. This provision will be in effect only
until January 1, 1975. At that time Section 5116 will be further
amended to provide that the community property is liable for the contracts of either spouse which are made after marriage [See Domestic
Relations; community property, this volume at 3521.
COMMENT
Previously, when a woman married, she lost her personal credit rating since she usually had to reapply for credit under her husband's
Selected 1973 California Legislation
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name. If she later became a widow or a divorcee, the importance
of this loss became apparent since she would be unable to get credit
as she had no credit history in her name [Assemblyman Henry Waxman, Press Release, June 11, 1973 (hereinafter cited as Waxman)].
Additionally, many creditors refused to extend credit to a married
woman unless she got her husband's consent; this was very demeaning
for a married woman who had earnings or property of her own [Waxrnan.l.
Section 1812.30 is designed to remedy this situation by requiring
a creditor to grant a woman credit in her own name if credit would
be given to a man in a similar financial situation. The provisions
of this section regarding credit for married and single women parallel
Section 1747.80 of the Civil Code (part of the Song-Beverly Credit
Card Act of 1971) dealing with discrimination in issuance of credit
cards.
It was also necessary to amend Section 5116 since creditors could
have denied credit to a woman pursuant to Section 1812.30 based
on the fact that once a married woman's earnings or separate property
became commingled with the community property it would no longer
be subject to her debts contracted after marriage. The great majority
of married women do not keep separate accounts, so a credit manager
could have denied credit to such a woman and would not have been
subjected to liability. Thus Section 5116 was amended to make the
community property liable for the debts of the wife contracted after
marriage, at least to the extent of her earnings and separate property.
This is, however, unlikely to silence the cries of equal rights advocates
for two. reasons. First, the total community property, including the
wife's commingled earnings and property, is still liable for the husband's debts made before or after marriage. Second, the non-working
wife will still be unable to obtain credit in her own right. This is
contrary to the theory of community property which gives the wife
an equal share of the property on the basis that her work in the home
is an equal contribution to the wealth of the community.
Chapter 999 allows a woman to recover her actual damages plus
$500. Actual damages would probably include recovery for higher
rates of interest actually obtained and the increased price of the item
at a business where she could receive credit. It is not clear whether
this would include expenses, such as rental of the desired item, until
credit could be obtained.
Pacific Law Journal Vol. 5
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Domestic Relations; developmentally disabled
Health and Safety Code §38064 (repealed); §416.95 (new);
§§416, 416.5, 416.6, 416.7, 416.8, 416.9, 416.14, 416.15, 416.17,
416.18, 416.23, 38000, 38001, 38003, 38004, 38050, 38051,
38054, 38057, 38058, 38059, 38062, 38100, 38101, 38103,
38104, 38105, 38106, 38109, 38120, 38121, 38122, 38123,
38150, 38200, 38201, 38202, 38203, 38250, 38251, 38252,
38253, 38255, 38256, 38257, 38257.1, 38258, 38260, 38291,
38300 (amended); Penal Code §1370.1 (amended); Probate Code
§1461.5 (new); Welfare and Institutions Code §6501 (repealed);
§6000.5 (new); §§6000, 7518 (amended).
AB 846 (Lanterman); STATS 1973, Ch 546
(Effective September 17, 1973)
Chapter 546 has been enacted to change the name of the Lanterman
Mental Retardation Services Act of 1969 [CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE div. 25 (commencing with §38000)] to the Lanterman Developmental Disabilities Services Act. The amended code sections change
references in the act from "mentally retarded" and "mental retardation" to "developmentally disabled" and "developmental disabilities."
Section 38003(h) of the Health and Safety Code defines developmental disability as being a disability attributable to mental retardation,
cerebral palsy, epilepsy, or other neurological handicapping condition
found to be closely related to mental retardation or to require treatment similar to that required for mentally retarded individuals.
Article 7.5 (commencing with §416) of the Health and Safety
Code has been amended to change references in provisions relating
to conservatorship and guardianship for mentally retarded persons to
refer to developmentally disabled persons. Section 416.95 has been
added to provide that prior to appointment of the Director of Health
as guardian or conservator of the person and/or the estate of a minor
or adult who is a developmentally disabled person, the court shall
inform such person: (1) of the nature and purpose of the proceedings; (2) that appointment of a guardian is a legal adjudication of
the person's incompetence; and (3) the effect of such adjudication
on his basic rights. After giving the person such information, the
court shall consult with the person so as to determine his opinion
concerning the appointment. Chapter 546 has also added Probate
Code Section 1461.5 to require the court to similarly inform an alleged
insane or incompetent person prior to the appointment of a guardian
Selected 1973 California Legislation
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for his person and/or estate and also to require the court to identify
the person who has been nominated as his guardian.
Section 38105 of the Health and Safety Code has been amended
to extend to each developmentally disabled person who is placed in
an out-of-home residential facility the personal fights (fight to telephone, correspondence, visitation, access to storage, and keeping of
personal possessions) and patient treatment fights (right to refuse shock
treatment and lobotomy) set forth in Section 5325 of the Welfare
and Institutions Code. These fights must be brought to the person's
attention by such means as the Director of Health may designate. Section 6501 of the Welfare and Institutions Code required that a mentally retarded person requiring hospitalization could be committed to
the State Department of Health for placement in a state hospital only
if the mentally retarded person had been a resident of the state
for at least one year. This section has been repealed.
Domestic Relations; mental health servicesright to refuse a lobotomy
Welfare and Institutions Code §5326 (amended).
AB 47 (Lanterman); STATS 1973, Ch 959
Section 5325 of the Welfare and Institutions Code reserves two types
of rights to the mentally ill and developmentally disabled-personal
rights (fight to telephone, correspondence, visitation, access to storage
space, and keeping of personal possessions) and patient treatment
right (fight to refuse shock treatment and lobotomy). Section 5326
previously allowed the professional person in charge of the mental
facility or his designee to deny the patient these rights for good cause.
Section 5326 has been amended to prohibit the professional person
in charge from denying the patient's fight to refuse a lobotomy, and
also to require the Director of Health to adopt regulations specifying
the conditions under which the remaining rights in Section 5325 may
be denied for good cause. In addition, each local mental health director must report quarterly to the Director of Health the number of
persons whose fights were denied and which rights were denied. These
reports are to be used by the Director of Health to identify individual
treatment records which may require further analysis and investigation.
See Generally:
1) 4 PAC. L.J., REviEw OF SELECTED 1972 CALwONI LEGISLATION 438 (1973).
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Domestic Relations; mentally retarded adult's
release from state hospitals
Health and Safety Code §§38120, 38121 (amended).
AB 188 (Cullen); STATS 1973, Ch 161
(Effective July 6, 1973)
Section 38120 of the Health and Safety Code provides that any
adult who has been admitted to a state hospital as a mentally retarded
patient has the right to a hearing by a writ of habeas corpus after
he submits a written request for release from the facility. Previously,
when the director of the facility or his designee received a written
request for release, he was required to notify only the superior court
of the request. Chapter 161 has amended Section 38120 to provide
that the director or his designee must also send a copy of the request
for release to the patient's parent, guardian, or conservator together
with a statement that notice of judicial proceedings taken pursuant
to such request will be forwarded by the court. These shall be
sent by registered or certified mail with a return receipt requested.
A copy of the request for release and the name and address of the
patient's parent, guardian, or conservator must also be sent to the
court.
Chapter 161 has also amended Section 38121 (relating to the time
and place of hearing, right to counsel, and grounds for release) to
provide that at the time the petition for the writ of habeas corpus
is filed with the court, the clerk must send a copy of the petition,
along with notification of the time and place of any evidentiary hearing
in the matter, to the parent, guardian, or conservator of the patient
seeking release or for whom release is sought. This is to be sent
by registered or certified mail with a return receipt requested. The
section has also been amended to require that the evidentiary hearing
in response to the petition be held no sooner than five judicial days
nor later than ten judicial days after a copy of the petition and notice
to the patient's parent, guardian, or conservator have been mailed.
Previously, the hearing was to be held within two days of the mailing.
Apparently Chapter 161 is designed to increase participation by the
person directly responsible for a mentally retarded adult in the judicial
hearing on his petition for release.
See Generally:
1)

CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §38000 et seq. (Lanterman Mental Retardation

Services Act of 1969).
2)

4 PAc. L.J., REvmw OF SELEcTED 1972 CAL FORNIA LEGISLATION 437 (1973)

(proceedings for appointment of a guardian or conservator).

Selected 1973 California Legislation

Domestic Relations

Domestic Relations; termination of parental control
Civil Code §232 (amended).
AB 1012 (Gonsalves); STATs 1973, Ch 686
Support: Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors
Section 232 of the Civil Code provides that children can be removed
from their parents and placed out for adoption when the parents have
proven themselves unfit. Reasons for removal from parental control
include abandonment, cruelty, neglect, habitual intemperance, moral
depravity, conviction of a felony, mental deficiency or mental illness,
and incapability of control or support. Section 232 has been amended
to expand the criteria upon which parents can be found unfit.
Section 232(a) (7) has been added to provide that the child can be
taken from the parents and placed out for adoption when the child has
been cared for in a foster home (having been placed there by
the juvenile court or other public or private agency) for a total
of two or more consecutive years and the court finds beyond a
reasonable doubt that return of the child to the parents would be
detrimental to the child and that his parents have failed during such
period in the foster home and are likely to fail in the future to provide
him with a home, care, control, and an adequate parental relationship.
Physical custody of the child by the parent or parents for insubstantial
periods of time during the required two-year period will not interrupt
the running of such period.
Section 232(a) (1) has been amended to modify prior law regarding
abandonment to provide that where one parent has abandoned the
child in the custody of the other parent for a period of one year or
more, the minor is freed from the custody and control of the parent
who has abandoned him. Previously, only when both parents had
abandoned the child for more than six months could the parent-child
relationship be terminated. Additionally, Section 232(a) (1) now
provides that in abandonment cases where the parents' whereabouts
are unknown, a petition can be filed and citation by publication commenced on the 120th day after the discovery of the child and the
proceedings commenced on the 180th day.
Habitual intemperance, as used in Section 232(a) (3), has been expanded to include those parents who are disabled (physical or mental
incapacity rendering the parent incapable of adequately caring for the
child) because of the habitual use of controlled substances [CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§11053-11058 (schedules I-V)], unless they
Pacific Law Journal Vol. 5
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are used as part of a medically prescribed plan. If the parents are
residents of another state or are foreign citizens, Section 232(a) (6)
provides that they may now be adjudged mentally ill or deficient by
two certified physicians and surgeons who are residents of such state
or foreign country. Additionally, Section 232(a) (6) now provides
that the parents of the child must be cited to be present at the hearing
and that the court must appoint an attorney to represent them if they
have no attorney.
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The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act [CAL. Civ. CODE tit.
9 (commencing with §5150)] has been enacted to avoid jurisdictional
competition and conflicts with foreign courts in matters of child custody and to assure that child custody litigation will ordinarily take
place in the state with which the child and his family have the closest
connection (§5150). The general policies of this act extend to other
nations as well as other states (§5172). These goals have been accomplished primarily through the specific description of jurisdictional
prerequisties for custody proceedings, by requiring that foreign decrees
be respected by the courts of this state, and by requiring that calendar
priority shall be given to all jurisdictional issues raised by a party
to the proceeding.
Section 5151 defines the terms which are necessary for the interpretation of this act. Some of the more important definitions are: (1)
"custody determination" means a court decision and court orders and
instructions providing for the custody of a child, including visitation
rights, but does not include a decision relating to child support or
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any other monetary obligation of any person; (2) "custody proceedding" includes proceedings in which a custody determination is one
of several issues, such as an action for dissolution of marriage or legal
separation, and includes child neglect and dependence proceedings;
and (3) "home state" means the state in which the child lived with
his parents, a parent, or a person acting as parent for at least six
consecutive months immediately preceding the time involved, and in
the case of a child less than six months old the state in which the
child lived from birth with any of the persons mentioned.
Prior to the enactment of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, the jurisdiction over child custody proceedings was normally
vested in either the state in which the child was domiciled or in
which he resided [3 WITKINS, SUMMARY oF CALIFORNIA LAW, Parent and Child §§7-9 (7th ed. 1960)]. Section 5152 has modified
this general rule by providing that, unless otherwise specified, the physical presence of the child, or of the child and one of the contestants,
is not sufficient alone to confer jurisdiction; nor is the physical presence
of the child an absolute jurisdictional prerequisite. This section confers jurisdiction to render an initial or modified decree upon any court
which is otherwise competent to decide custody matters in any of the
following situations: (1) California is the home state of the child
at the time of commencement of the proceeding; (2) the child is absent
from this state but a parent or person acting as a parent continues
to live in this state and California was the child's home state within
six months prior to the commencement of the proceeding; (3) it is
in the child's best interest that a court of this state assume jurisdiction
because the child and his parents, or the child and at least one contestant, have a significant connection with this state, and substantial
evidence is available in this state concerning the child's present or
future care, protection, training, and personal relationships; (4) the
child is physically present in this state, and he has been abandoned
or it is necessary to protect the child because he has been subjected
to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse or is otherwise neglected
or dependant; or (5) it appears that no other state would have jurisdiction under prerequisites substantially in accordance with the above,
or another state has declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground
that this state is the more appropriate forum to determine the custody
of the child, and it is in the best interest of the child that this court
assume jurisdiction.
Section 5155 provides that a court of this state shall not exercise
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jurisdiction if at the time of filing the petition a proceeding concerning
the custody of the child is pending in another state exercising jurisdiction in substantial conformity with the provisions of this act,
unless the proceeding has been stayed because the out-of-state
court believes that this state is the more appropriate forum or
for other reasons. This section also specifies procedures by which a
court of this state is required to make inquiries regarding the pendency of child custody proceedings in foreign courts. Upon being informed of a pending foreign proceeding and that it was initiated prior
to the California court's assumption of jurisdiction, the California court
must stay its proceedings and communicate with the foreign court
for the purpose of determining the more appropriate forum. Even
if the California court is informed of the initiation of foreign custody
proceedings after it has assumed jurisdiction, it must still communicate
with that court in order to determine the more appropriate forum.
Section 5156 provides that a court of this state may decline to exercise jurisdiction in a custody proceeding at any time prior to rendering
a decree if, under the circumstances of the case, it finds that it is
an inconvenient forum and that a court of another state is a more
appropriate forum. The motion of inconvenient forum may be made
by the court, either party to the proceeding, the guardian ad litem,
or a representative of the child. In determining the question of inconvenient forum, the court must consider the child's interest in having
another state assume jurisdiction. For this purpose the court may
take into account several factors, including: (1) whether another state
is or recently was the child's home state; (2) whether another state
has a closer connection with the child and his family or with the child
and one or more of the contestants; (3) whether substantial evidence
concerning the child's present or future care, protection, training, and
personal relationships is more readily available in another state; (4)
whether the parties have agreed on another forum which is no less
appropriate; and (5) whether the exercise of jurisdiction by the court
of this state would contravene any of the purposes of this title
(§5150). If the court determines that this state is an inconvenient
forum, it may either dismiss the proceedings or stay the proceedings
upon the condition that a custody proceeding be promptly commenced
in another named state or upon any other conditions which may be
just and proper, including the condition that a moving party stipulate
his consent and submission to the jurisdiction of the other forum. If
it appears to the court that this state is clearly an inappropriate forum,
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it may require the party who commenced the proceedings to pay costs,
attorneys' fees, travel, and other necessary expenses incurred by other
parties or witnesses. Even if it is determined that this state is
an appropriate forum, the court may decline to exercise its jurisdiction
if the custody proceeding is incidental to an action for divorce or other
proceeding. The court does not necessarily relinquish jurisdiction over
the divorce or other proceeding by so declining. Section 5156 also
provides certain procedures regarding communication with foreign
courts concerning the issue of inconvenient forum. One such requirement is that a communication from a foreign court stating that
this state is a more convenient forum must be filed in the custody
registry of the appropriate court (discussed infra).
Section 5157 grants discretion to the courts of this state in exercising
jurisdiction over custody cases where the petitioner has acted improperly in acquiring custody of the child. Specifically, this section provides that: (1) the court has discretionary jurisdiction if the petitioner
for an initial decree has wrongfully taken the child from another
state or has engaged in similar reprehensible conduct; (2) a court
of this state cannot exercise jurisdiction unless it is required in the
child's best interests when the petitioner for a modification of a foreign
decree has improperly removed or retained the child from the person
lawfully entitled to custody; and (3) a court of this state has discretionary jurisdiction if the petitioner has violated any other provision
of a foreign custody decree. A court dismissing a petition under the
authority of this section may charge the petitioner with necessary travel
and other expenses, including attorneys' fees, incurred by other parties
or their witnesses.
Section 5163 prohibits a court of this state from modifying a foreign
custody decree unless: (1) it appears to the court that the court which
rendered the decree does not now have jurisdiction substantially in
conformance with the provisions of this title or has declined to assume
jurisdiction; and (2) the court of this state has jurisdiction. It should
be noted that Section 5163 is a general restriction on a court's power
to modify foreign decrees and the specific limitation set forth in Section 5157(2) must also be satisfied (discussed supra).
Section 5158 provides that every party to a custody proceeding must
provide, under oath, certain information in his first pleading or in
an affidavit attached to that pleading. The information required by
this section is as follows: (1) the child's present address and the
places where the child has lived within the last five years; (2) the
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names and present addresses of the persons with whom the child has
lived during this five-year period; (3) whether the party has participated as a witness, party, or in any other capacity in any other litigation concerning the custody of the same child in this or any other
state; (4) whether he has information of any custody proceeding pending in a court of this or any other state concerning the same child;
and (5) whether the party knows of any person not a party to the
proceedings who has physical custody of the child or claims to have
custody or visitation rights with respect to the child. Section 5158
also provides that every party to the proceeding is under a continuing
duty to inform the court of any other custody proceeding regarding
the same child, whether foreign or domestic, of which he acquires
knowledge. Section 5159 provides that if a court acquires knowledge
by virtue of Section 5158 or otherwise that any person other than
a party to the proceeding has physical custody of the child or claims
to have custody or visitation rights with respect to the child, then it
must join any such person as a party to the proceeding. Any person
so joined must be duly notified of the pending proceeding and his
joinder as a party.
Section 5153 provides that before a court may render a custody
decree the following persons must be given reasonable notice and an
opportunity to be heard: (1) contestants; (2) any parent whose parental rights have not been previously terminated; and (3) any person
who has physical custody of the child. If any of the persons specified
in this section are outside the state of California, then notice must
be given in accordance with the provisions of Section 5154. Under
Section 5154, the notice required in order to exercise jurisdiction over
persons situated in a foreign state may be made in any of the following ways: (1) by personal delivery in the manner prescribed for service of process within this state; (2) the manner prescribed for service
of process by the law of the place in which service is made; (3)
by any form of mail addressed to the person to be served and requesting a receipt; and (4) as directed by the court (including publication
if other means of notification are ineffective). Any notice given pursuant to this section must be served, mailed, delivered, or last published at least ten days before any hearing is commenced in this state.
However, no notice must be given if a person submits to the jurisdiction of the court. Depending upon the manner in which the notice
was given, proof of service of process may be made by utilizing any
of the following procedures: (1) by affidavit of the process server;
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(2) in the manner prescribed by the law of this state or in accordance
with the law of the place in which the service is made; (3) if service
is made by mail, a receipt signed by the addressee or other evidence
of delivery to the addressee; or (4) if notice is given by publication
or in any other manner directed by the court, proof of service of process may be shown in the manner directed by the court order pursuant
to which the service is made.
Section 5162 provides that the courts of this state must recognize
and enforce an initial or modification decree of a foreign court which
has either: (1) assumed jurisdiction under statutory provisions substantially in accordance with this title; or (2) rendered its decree under
factual circumstances meeting the jurisdictional standards substantially
similar to those of this title. Section 5161 provides that a custody
decree rendered by a court of this state which has jurisdiction under
Section 5152 (discussed supra) is binding on all parties who have
been notified pursuant to the provisions of this title, or who have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court, and who have been given an
opportunity to be heard. As to these parties the custody decree is
conclusive as to all issues of law and fact decided and as to the custody
determination made unless and until that determination is modified
pursuant to law, including the provisions of this title.
Sections 5167 through 5169 specify certain procedures by which
the court or any party to the proceeding may gather evidence concerning the issue of custody. Section 5167 authorizes any party to the
proceeding, or a guardian ad litem or other representative of the child,
to take testimony of witnesses in another state by deposition or otherwise. The court may also direct that the testimony of a person be
taken in another state and prescribe the manner and terms upon which
it shall be taken. Section 5168 provides that a court of this state
may request a foreign court to hold a hearing to adduce evidence,
to order a party to produce or give evidence, or to have social studies
made concerning the custody of the child. The cost of these services
may be assessed against the parties or, if necessary, paid by the state.
A court of this state may request a foreign court to order a party
to appear at the proceedings pending in this state and, if that party
has physical custody of the child, to appear with the child. Section
5169 provides that a court of this state may hold a hearing to adduce
evidence concerning custody matters and that it may order a person
in this state to appear alone or with the child at a custody proceeding
in another state. The authority vested under Section 5169 may only
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be exercised when a foreign court has requested the hearing or the
appearance of the party. Section 5170 requires a court of this state
to preserve the pleadings, orders, decrees, and any records of hearings,
social studies, and other pertinent documents until the child reaches
18 years of age. Upon appropriate request by a foreign court, the
court of this state must forward certified copies of any or all of such
documents.
Section 5165 provides that the clerk of each superior court of this
state must establish and maintain a custody register which shall contain the following information: (1) certified copies of custody decrees
of other states received for filing; (2) communications as to the pendency of custody proceedings in other states; (3) communications concerning a finding of inconvenient forum by a court of another state;
and (4) other communications or documents concerning custody proceedings in another state which may affect the jurisdiction of a court
of this state or the disposition to be made by it in a custody proceeding. Section 5164 provides that a certified copy of a foreign custody
decree may be filed with the clerk of a superior court of this state and
upon such filing that it shall be given effect as though rendered in
this state. Section 5164 also provides that any person who violates
a foreign custody decree in this state may be required to pay the necessary expenses of the person entitled to custody or his witnesses.
Section 5166 provides that upon the request of a foreign court or
a party who has a legitimate interest in a custody decree, the clerk
of the superior court must forward a certified copy of the decree to
that individual.
COMMENT

By specifically delineating the instances in which the court may exercise jurisdiction in child custody cases, the Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction Act serves to eliminate many of the jurisdictional conflicts
which were created by case law in this area. In any child custody
case, the main concern of the court should be for the child's best
interests and welfare [Kovacs v. Brewer, 356 U.S. 604, 612 (1958)].
This consideration appears to be the basis of the rule in Sampsell
v. Superior Court [32 Cal. 2d 763, 197 P.2d 739 (1948)], the leading
California custody jurisdiction case. There the court held that jurisdiction is based on the state's interest in the welfare of children or in
the family unit of which he is a part [32 Cal. 2d at 773, 197 P.2d
at 750]. In effect, this meant that a court could assume jurisdiction
when the child was domiciled or physically present in the state. It
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further meant that a court could consider a case brought by a parent
or other petitioner domiciled in the child's "home state" even though
the child was then residing elsewhere. This dual basis of jurisdiction
created problems which often produced results more detrimental than
beneficial to the child's welfare.
In custody suits resulting from a dissolution or separation of the
child's parents, often one parent would take the child, go to a foreign
state, and maintain a custody action there on the basis of the child's
presence in that state. At the same time, the spouse remaining in
the home state could file a custody action there on the basis of the
state's interest in the family unit. This often resulted in conflicting
decrees from the different jurisdictions regarding the custody of the
same child. In some cases, because the foreign court had not obtained
jurisdiction over the out-of-state spouse through either service of process or by giving him actual notice, he was not bound by its decree.
Sampsell did little to alleviate this problem. In that case, the court
held that since both states had jurisdiction each could conceivably decide the issue of custody [32 Cal. 2d at 779, 197 P.2d at 750]. The
issue was further confused by the court's holding that since a state
can modify its own decrees or issue a new decree on the basis of
a change in circumstances, a sister state also had the right to modify
a foreign state's decree on the same basis [32 Cal. 2d at 780, 197
P.2d at 750]. Thus a parent or other contestant in a custody proceeding could "seize" the child, "run" to a foreign state, and petition the
court for a custody decree on the basis of the child's presence in that
state. There the petitioner could plead a change in circumstances with
respect to the legal custodian who was often unable to appear or perhaps even unaware of the proceedings in the foreign state. The "seize
and run" incentive which apparently results from the Sampsell decision
certainly does not appear to be beneficial to the welfare of the child
who conceivably could become the object of successive "kidnappings"
in order for a parent to gain access to a foreign court.
The absurdity of the situation was reflected in Stout v. Pate [120
Cal. App. 2d 699, 261 P.2d 788 (1953)]. In Stout the father
"seized" his children and "ran" to Georgia. The mother followed
and instituted proceedings in Georgia on the basis of the children's
presence there. She then "seized" the children and returned them
to California. Once in California, she initiated a separate custody
proceeding and attempted to have the Georgia proceeding dismissed.
However, the Georgia court refused to do so. The father challenged
the California suit on the ground that a proceeding was pending
Pacific Law Journal Vol. 5

Domestic Relations

in another state. The California court held that because the
children were physically present in this state, the court had jurisdiction and that proceedings in another state were not a bar to
such jurisdiction. As to the Georgia proceeding, the court held that
recognition of the Georgia court's decree was purely a matter of comity
and, as the court could use its discretion as to what was best for
the children, it was not required to honor Georgia's decree [120
Cal. App. 2d at 704, 261 P.2d at 790].
When confronted with the possibility of continuous "kidnappings"
of children involved in custody matters, California adopted a "clean
hands" doctrine with respect to these suits. In Leathers v. Leathers
[162 Cal. App. 2d 768, 328 P.2d 853 (1958)] it was held that
in "seize and run!' cases the petitioner who had abducted the children
came into court with "unclean hands." The court declared that in
these instances the foreign decree would be enforced without a reexamination of the merits [162 Cal. App. 2d at 775, 328 P.2d at 856].
This appears to have solved the "seize and run" problem in many
California cases, but it did not prevent the petitioner from "seizing"
a child in California and going to a foreign jurisdiction to obtain a
decree.
In light of these problems and their grave implications with respect
to the welfare of children, the drafters of the Uniform Act felt that
it was necessary to devise precise jurisdictional guidelines to overcome
the problems of conflicts of laws and the "seize and run" situation.
[See Bodenheimer, The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act: A
Legal Remedy for Children Caught in the Conflict of Laws, 22 VAND.
L. REv. 1207 (1969)]. The drafters felt that the following jurisdictional elements were necessary in custody cases to bolster the interstate
recognition of foreign decrees: (1) a provision for the granting of
exclusive jurisdiction to the court which has the greatest access to information concerning the child; (2) a provision for channeling all outof-state evidence to this forum to guarantee a decree based on all
available evidence; and (3) a provision for resolution of jurisdictional
conflicts on the basis of forum non conveniens or priority of initiation
of proceedings.
The enactment of Chapter 693 is a significant step in promoting the
welfare of the child. Though the prerequisites to jurisdiction are essentially the same as those required by case law (§5152), the court
no longer has an automatic right to take jurisdiction in disregard of
pending foreign proceedings. The limitations of jurisdiction set forth
in the Act are designed "in the interests of greater stability of home
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environment and of secure family relationships for the child"
(§5150d). When comparing this act to the previous case law where
the results were often detrimental to the stability and security of the
child, it appears that the Act at least provides the means to effectively
reduce the uncertainties inherent in the case law and to eliminate the
threat to the child of abduction and continuous decree modifications.
This chapter ensures that a court will include all relevant factors
in its determination of what is best for the child's welfare by refusing
to allow a court to engage in jurisdictional battles with courts of
other states (§5155) and by requiring courts to make every effort
to notify all parties (§§5158, 5159, 5160, 5167, 5168). The possibility of subsequent modifications of a decree by other courts is reduced by: (1) gathering all possible parties in one action and providing for travel expenses if necessary (§5161); (2) making the result
of that action binding on those parties (§5162); and (3) requiring
that a court which does modify a decree to take into consideration the decree itself and any other documents that may have been filed with the
foreign court (§5163).
This chapter also codifies the "clean hands" doctrine (§5157). By
providing a statutory bar to "seize and run" cases, the Act effectively
discourages such conduct on the part of any contestant who may litigate his case in the courts of this state.
Finally, additional impetus is given to foreign courts to enforce California decrees by requiring California courts to: (1) enforce the
decrees of other states (§5164); (2) provide copies of their decrees
to other courts which may request them (§5166); and (3) hold hearings to adduce evidence to be used in suits in other states (§5169).
Such cooperation from California courts may induce foreign courts,
in the spirit of reciprocity, to enforce California decrees. It appears
that these changes will significantly contribute to the primary objective
of all child custody cases-the attainment of a stable home environment which is beneficial to the child in whose interest the state acts.
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